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Advertised. Product Liability:
Safeguards Against Unjust Awards
Robert F. Hanley* and Robert E. Mason, Jr.**
L EGAL COUNSEL to manufacturers of nationally distributed con-
sumer products naturally view with alarm the increasing
number of product liability cases in which liability without fault
has been imposed.,
A great deal has been written regarding the various legal and
economic theories underlying this phenomenon. The major
reasons advanced in support thereof appear to be that (1) modern
economic-social philosophy dictates that where injury is inflicted
without fault, liability should be borne by those most capable
of bearing it; i.e., manufacturers, and (2) in view of the com-
plicated nature of modem manufacturing procedures, it is un-
reasonable to require plaintiffs to prove actual negligence on the
part of a manufacturer.2
Undoubtedly, cases could be found in which the application
of either of these theories could be thought to produce equitable
results. Nevertheless, neither rationale will support the judicial
imposition of liability without fault as a general solution to the
problem. Certainly the social and economic ramifications in-
volved in the adoption of such a policy are questions for the
legislatures rather than the courts. Perhaps in no other field
of modern jurisprudence have courts expressed such a willing-
ness to exercise their power of "judicial legislation."
It is conceded that the second proposition advanced-the
plaintiff's inability to prove negligence-is more properly within
the realm of judicial determination. However this theory pre-
*Of the Chicago, Illinois Bar.
** Of the Chicago, Illinois Bar.
[Editor's Note: The authors are members of the law firm of Crowell
and Leibman of Chicago, Ill., General Counsel to the defendant manufactur-
ing company in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., which is discussed
here and in several articles in this symposium.]
1 As referred to herein, "liability without fault" embraces all forms of
action which recognize the existence of liability without requiring proof of
negligence on the part of the defendant, whether accomplished through the
utilization of warranty theories or through the extension of conventional
concepts of tort.
2 For an excellent discussion of the legal and economic aspects of liability
without fault, see Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 614, 809
(1955).
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supposes not only that a plaintiff's most difficult task is that of
proving negligence, but also that it is more difficult for plaintiffs
to prove the over-all elements of their case than it is for defend-
ants to prove the elements of theirs.
While this position might have been valid at one time, it is
difficult to maintain today in view of the broad discovery pro-
cedures existing in most jurisdictions, to which both parties have
equal access. In fact, there is good reason to believe that plaintiffs
enjoy a distinct advantage in the usual product liability case. A
plaintiff in such a case usually utilizes discovery as a means of
determining such things as the exact composition of the defend-
ant's product, and the production, control, and inspection pro-
cedures involved in its manufacture. While this information is
usually within the control of the defendant, it consists of facts
which are generally capable of rather precise determination.
Employees and executives familiar with company policies and
procedures can be questioned, and in a great many instances the
facts in question are matters of company record. On the other
hand, the manufacturer's use of discovery is often directed
toward determining the existence or non-existence of a causal
relationship between its product and the injury complained of.
Relevant factors in this determination are the conditions under
which the product was used, as well as the plaintiff's physical
condition at and prior to the time of use. This information is
often within the knowledge of one person only-the plaintiff, and
is rarely a matter of record. Furthermore, the determination of
factors such as physical condition and chemical causation almost
always involve questions of complex medical opinion rather than
concrete fact. Thus, the information sought by the defendant is
usually less susceptible of accurate determination through the
use of discovery procedures.
It is beyond the scope of this commentary to examine the
legal or economic justification for the judicial imposition of
liability without fault.8 It should be apparent, however, that the
utilization of such a theory emphasizes the importance of insist-
ing that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof traditionally required
of them. If this is not done, responsible manufacturers face the
possibility of being subjected to unwarranted jury verdicts
which can irreparably mar the reputation they have established
for themselves and their products. If liability without fault is




to be coupled with a judicial disposition toward requiring only
minimal proof as to product defects or causal connection, then
defendants need only attempt to predict the amount of the verdict,
and settle for slightly less than this amount on the courthouse
steps.
The problem is perhaps most readily apparent in situations in
which courts employ express warranty as a means of extending
liability. Abrogating the requirement of privity of contract, by
holding that a manufacturer's representations may extend to the
general public, expands the scope of express warranty to include
a large and indeterminate group of people with whom he has no
contact. It is apparent that a manufacturer of nationally dis-
tributed products has absolutely no control over the applicability
of his general representations to specific individuals. Further-
more, the difficulty of defending against a claim that a particular
plaintiff has relied upon such representations is obviously in-
creased. In such a situation it seems clear that the plaintiff's
burden of proof should be at least as stringent as that required
in cases where privity exists. In other words, if courts permit
remote purchasers to rely on express warranty, it would seem
not only fair but necessary to hold such purchasers to a strict
burden of proof regarding the representations made, their re-
liance thereon, the existence of a defect constituting a breach of
the representations, and a direct causal relationship between the
defect alleged and the injury complained of.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the recent case of Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co.,4 apparently recognized the impor-
tance of this proposition in an action based upon a theory of
express warranty.
The plaintiff in the Rogers case alleged that she had pur-
chased the defendant's product in reliance upon representations
made in its advertising. She further alleged that she had used
the product in accordance with the directions and that she had
suffered injuries as a direct result of deleterious ingredients in
the product. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer
but the Court of Appeals reversed, 5 and the case was certified
to the Ohio Supreme Court.6 Directly facing the problem pre-
sented, the court abrogated the requirement of privity of contract
in actions based upon express warranty.
4 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958).
5 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N. E. 2d 871 (1957).
6 139 N. E. 2d at 887.
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The Rogers decision has generally been interpreted as one
extending the scope of manufacturers' liability, in that it per-
mitted a plaintiff, who was not in privity of contract with the
defendant, to utilize the warranty formula and thus avoid the
necessity of proving negligence. However, with respect to the
question relevant here-the existence of judicial safeguards
against unwarranted jury awards-the Rogers case could well
be viewed as a bulwark against spurious claims.
The court clearly held that in order to sustain her action,
the plaintiff would have to allege and prove that (1) the defend-
ant made express representations as to the quality and merit of
its product, (2) the product was purchased in reliance upon
such representations, (3) there was a defect in the product
constituting a breach of these representations, and (4) she suf-
fered injury by reason of such defect.7
The primary issue presented in the Rogers case was, of
course, the legal adequacy of the plaintiff's complaint rather than
a determination of the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial.
Nevertheless, the decision clearly stands for the proposition that
recovery would be denied unless the plaintiff proved each of the
essential elements of warranty, namely: representation, reliance,
breach, causation, and injury.
Since the Rogers case was never tried on its merits, there is
no way of knowing how these principles would have been applied
by a trial court. However, this recent statement of the Ohio Su-
preme Court on the subject of a manufacturer's liability contains,
in principle, the safeguards necessary to protect manufacturers
from spurious claims.
It is interesting to compare the rationale of the Rogers
opinion with the standard of proof established by the Court of
Appeals of Cuyahoga County in a case presenting strikingly
similar issues.
In Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,8 the plaintiff
sought recovery for injuries allegedly suffered when a home
permanent waving solution was applied to her hair by a third
person. The complaint was based upon separate counts of negli-
gence, express warranty, and implied warranty. The plaintiff
alleged in her complaint that the directions for use had been
carefully followed, but that because the product was unwhole-
7 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612
(1958).
8 149 N. E. 2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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some, injurious, deleterious and unfit for human use, she had
suffered injuries as a direct result of the carelessness and negli-
gence of the defendant, and by reason of its breach of warranty
which had induced the initial purchase.
With respect to the issue of reliance, the evidence revealed
that the plaintiff had requested a third person to purchase the
product by its trade name. However, there was no evidence that
the purchase was made in reliance upon any express warranty
of safety or fitness, or that the product was in fact "unwhole-
some, injurious, deleterious or unfit for human use."
Although there was evidence introduced which indicated
that the person who had applied the solution had followed the
directions, and that the plaintiff had sustained some injury, the
only evidence as to causal connection between the application
of the defendant's product and the plaintiff's injury was the
testimony of a doctor who had examined the plaintiff some five
months after the application in question.9
It was established that the witness was not a chemist and
had not obtained a chemical analysis of the product.10 Further-
more, he admitted that his only knowledge regarding the compo-
sition of permanent waving solutions had been obtained from
secondary sources." Although he initially identified the offend-
ing ingredient, 12 he later admitted his inability so to do.13 In
spite of the foregoing the doctor was permitted to testify, in
answer to a hypothetical question, that some chemical in the
defendant's product in fact caused the injury.
The trial court sustained defendant's motion for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. The Court of
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case on the grounds that the
plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury.
On the basis of evidence presented, it would appear the
Court of Appeals looked little further than the existence of injury
in determining the burden which the plaintiff would have to bear.
At best, a jury could only speculate as to the existence of a de-
fect in the defendant's product or a causal connection between the
use of the product and the plaintiff's injury-an approach which
9 Transcript of Record, p. 181, Napier (Markovich) v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., Civil No. 664,930, Ct. Common Pleas (Cuyahoga Co., Ohio, 1958).
10 Id. at p. 171.
11 Id. at p. 172.
12 The ingredient so identified was not in fact present in the product.
13 Transcript of Record, p. 250.
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was specifically repudiated in the case of Leach v. Joyce Prod-
ucts Co.1
4
In conclusion, it is submitted that if courts are willing to
assume the responsibility of imposing liability without fault, they
must recognize the importance of holding plaintiffs to the burdens
of proof which they have traditionally been required to bear.
There is no valid social, economic, or legal theory which justifies
a relaxation of these standards of proof under either theory of
tort or express warranty. Particularly in the latter instance,
where remote purchasers having no contact with the defendant
are permitted to maintain actions without a showing of negli-
gence, such relaxation can only encourage a multiplicity of
spurious claims.
14 116 N. E. 2d 834, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
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